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Introduction
During the last decade foreign banks have entered several East European (EE) transition 
countries, though to diferent degrees.　According to the review by Narodowy Bank Polski 
(National Bank of Poland) several countries regarded foreign strategic investors in their banking 
system as a means to improve both the quantity and quality of financial intermediation.　Some-
times these advances resulted in higher risks for the stability of the financial system, emphasising 
the danger of a more volatile credit supply.　Although research has been done for the other 
areas ― where foreign bank penetration is high as wel ― the empirical research to date on the 
role of foreign banks as regards credit stability in a cross-section of EE countries is rather 
limited.　Several authors divide foreign banks into greenfields and takeovers, so as to diferen-
tiate between modes of entry, and investigate whether the financial health of the parent bank 
influences its EE-subsidiaries (Voinea, 2008; De Haan, 2004).　They suggested that extent to 
which foreign bank subsidiaries difer from domestic banks wil also depend on their level of 
involvment in the multinational banking organisation they are part of.
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Abstract
Advanced internationalization of East European economies in the first decade of 2000s 
resulted in increased foreign presence and in several countries credit markets are dominated by 
foreign-owned banks.　This paper analyses the development for foreign ownership and its 
impact on financial markets in Eastern Europe.　Structural and dynamic aspects of foreign 
banking as wel as statistical results are presented.　Costs and benefits of foreign banks entry in 
these countries are discussed and are perceived to be one of the most important factors influencing 
the shape of banking sectors in East European economies.　Although their actions tend to focus 
mostly on corporate services, the perceived need for support of the client base is also the most 
important reason for their growth.　It can also be argued that the direct benefits from entry are 
limited and the indirect ones are quite evident, mainly in the areas of corporate finances and 
foreign trade.
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The impact of greenfields and takeovers on host economy may difer because they reflect 
difering entry strategies of the parent bank.　A foreign bank unfamiliar with a country to 
which its wants to expand may first establish a greenfield to “test the waters”.　Buying an existing 
bank may on the other hand reflect a longer-term or more definite commitment.　Some parent 
banks establish greenfields because they want to control al aspects of the new afiliate right 
from the beginning.　Other financial institutions put more emphasis on the need to be a real 
local bank, and are thus more in favour of taking over an existing bank.　Usualy, the organisa-
tional and corporate governance links between a parent bank and a takeover are usualy looser 
than those between a parent bank and the greenfields ie new subsidiaries or afiliated banks.
This paper is structured as folows.　In the folowing section a brief overview of the literature 
on foreign banks and financial stability wil be presented, after which recent developments in 
internationalization of EE banking and conclusions wil folow.
Banking globalization ― some theoretical considerations
The analytical and empirical studies of foreign banking expansion have been atempted 
from various conceptual angles.　Two of them are extensively developed as they provide helpful 
insight into the mechanism and operation of Western banks in Eastern Europe.　First is the theory 
of multinational firm (Hymer, 1960; Grubbel, 1977; Rugman, 1981; DeYoung and Nole, 1996) 
and the other is the heterodox theory of international trade known also as the eclectic paradigm 
theory (Dunning, 1977; Cantwel and Narula, 2003).　According to the first approach banks 
enter foreign markets based on such fundamentals as bank size, bank rate of return and the 
globalization strategy.　The more recent studies however are more in line with the heterodox 
theory as this approach emphasizes the location and integration factors rather than on company’s 
motivation for expansion.　This approach seems also more in line with the recent globalization 
trends in world financial markets and fits more with the curent ownership-location-globalization 
characteristics of world economy in particular with the integration of financial markets within 
European Community.
Among the factors that impact company’s decision to enter foreign markets certain groups 
of factors are regarded more important than others.　The first group is the “folow the 
customer” strategies which includes foreign direct investment and bilateral trade.　According to 
this view banks folow their customers to utilize their data base and to service them in foreign 
markets.　This strategy is also known as “defensive expansion” and is represented by several 
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empirical studies (Grubbel, 1977; Wiliams, 2002; Goldberg and Johnson, 1990; Miler and Parkhe, 
1998).　Literature that supports this approach with regard to foreign trade includes Glosse and 
Goldberg, 1991; Yamori, 1998; Buch, 2000.
The “pecking order theory” emphasizes the structure of capital flows as the foundation of 
banking expansion.　International capital flows influenced by information costs wil predict the 
folowing order of foreign capital inflows: foreign direct investment (FDI) wil cause bank lending 
wil cause portfolio investment.　FDI wil also initiate the process as it lowers high cost of 
information required for initial entry into foreign market and as the economy advances and complies 
with international norms, information costs wil be further reduced and more capital inflow wil 
folow.
The other group of factors relates to market complementarity.　Including GDP, size and 
distance, financial structure development and prospects for future profitability and many studies 
found out that these do have a significant explanatory value.　On the other hand, some studies 
(Wezel, 2004; Sagari, 1992) found that GDP is not a significant factor in external expansion.　
Financial market development was generaly found to be significant but not in a capital - scarce 
economy as banking capital goes where business opportunities are higher.　Studies that support 
this view include Blealey and Kaplanis, 1996.
The other group of factors is related to various kind of risk (political, banking, currency 
and institutional factors are placed in the category of market risk because they influence market 
atractiveness).　Hence, underdeveloped institutions are associated with poor economic 
performance, and such factors as coruption, speculation, grey economy would increase transaction 
costs.　See Papaioannou, 2005 and Bol, 2002 who emphasize the role of institutional reform 
and regulations in explaining the flow of banking capital.　In this group one may also place the 
proponents of so caled “Lucas paradox”, which explains why capital would not flow from rich 
to poor economies.　Inefective regulations, coruption, lack of transparency are the main factors 
that explain asymmetry in the banking capital expansion (Alfaro, 2003 and Bevan, Estrin and 
Meyer, 2004).
The expansion of foreign banks into less-developed banking systems is represented by 
several studies.　The majority of this literature focuses on the influence of foreign banks on the 
eficiency of domestic economy banking systems.　Such studies generaly find that foreign 
bank entry has positive eficiency efects (e.g. Claessens et al., 2001; Lensink and Hermes, 
2003).　However, efficiency gains may be (partly) offset if a sufficient degree of tradeoff 
between banking eficiency and banking stability is present.
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Most empirical literature on foreign bank entry for domestic economy financial stability is 
not very extensive.　For example, there is no single, comprehensive theory of multinational 
banking, especialy in an emerging market or transition country context vis-à-vis various 
degrees of financial and monetary integration.　Certain strategies through which foreign banks 
may influence the stability of the domestic economy banking system can be identified and they 
usualy state that foreign bank subsidiaries are not completely independent organisations, but 
form part of a larger bank holding company (parent bank) with an internationaly diversified 
asset portfolio under diferent risk-benefit scenarios.　Their strategies wil be influenced by 
decisions of this (foreign-based) holding company.　Parent bank may ofer a “back-up facility” 
or serve as a lender of last resort during crisis periods, or through transfer pricing may manage 
an internal capital market and centralised treasury operations to alocate capital and financial 
liquidity over its subsidiaries (Stein, 1997).　This may result in a more stable credit supply of 
the foreign based subsidiary and a supportive parent bank and enhanced funding sources may 
reduce an overal banking risk of insolvency and financial liquidity in foreign countries.　It can 
also be argued that foreign bank subsidiaries may recover from external disturbances relatively 
easily, compared to domestic banks, and can maintain adequate credit supply.
There is enough evidence to suggest, that foreign banks’ credit supply may be less stable 
than credit granted by domestic banks.　This wil be the case if foreign banks are more sensitive 
to financial cycles and to the changing domestic economy macroeconomic environment.　Some 
authors, (for example, Wiliams, 1997) argue that internalisation theory provides a cohesive and 
internaly consistent framework within which diferent theories of multinational banking can be 
analysed – each focusing on a specific aspect of internalisation theory, so that testable hypothe-
ses can be developed.　On the other side, Morgan and Strahan (2002) show that, foreign bank 
entry may ease the effect of a general bank capital disturbances on firm investment in the 
domestic economy, since they can rely on parental financial liquidity and capital back up.　
Also, the impact of a disturbances in the domestic economy may be enhanced, as foreign banks 
wil realocate their portfolio in response to the expected risk/return ratios.　The theoretical 
aggregated efect of foreign bank entry on domestic economy business cycle volatility thus 
remains ambiguous.
Another set of variables emerge if foreign bank subsidiaries react not so much to changes 
in the domestic economy economic conditions (“pul factor”), but rather to changes in the parent 
bank’s home country (“push factor”).　Slow down in economic activity in the domestic economy 
may force a capital-constrained parent bank to reduce activities, including those of foreign sub-
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sidiaries and foreign operations may be among the first to be reduced.　This would be a positive 
correlation between the domestic economy business cycle and the subsidiary’s credit supply 
especialy when the parent bank’s financial condition is unstable.　When economic conditions 
in the home country worsen, parent banks wil increase their eforts to expand their activities 
abroad, since investment opportunities in the host market are scarce.　Vice versa, when domestic 
economy conditions improve, the opportunity costs of limiting home country lending increase 
and banks may alocate less capital to their foreign subsidiaries (Molyneux and Seth, 1998; 
Moshirian, 2001).　In this scenario there is a negative relationship between the home country 
business cycle and the subsidiary’s credit supply.　The later is more likely if parent banks are 
financialy healthy and bank holding capital is free to prioritize the highest returns.
Foreign banks may be influenced by poor performance or strategy changes by their parent 
banks.　First, a foreign bank may be liquidated if the parent bank experiences problems and 
decides to close some of its subsidiaries.　A recent example of an impact of parent bank problems 
on foreign banks operating in Eastern Europe was the withdrawal of Dresdner Bank from Romania 
and the Czech Republic, which was apparently linked to Dresdner's problems at the 
headquarters.　Second, managers of international banks admit to alocating capital to subsidiaries 
with the highest expected returns (De Haas & Naaborg, 2005).　Therefore, even a profitable 
foreign subsidiary could be closed in order to realocate capital to even more profitable project 
in another country.
Diferences between foreign and domestic banks are not only related to the fact that a foreign 
bank subsidiary is part of an international banking organisation, but can also result from other 
diferences in banks’ strategies and balance sheet health.　For example, banks difer in their 
credit strategies and planning horizons.　Some banks may grant credit on a “transaction-by-
transaction-basis” and the credit may be increased to meet the extra demand for finance when 
the economy improves, and decrease credit supply when economic conditions worsen.　Other 
financial institutions may finance their clients “through the cycle” and wil not easily cut of 
credit lines in case of temporary adverse economic developments.　Such relationship lending 
wil be less sensitive to business cycle fluctuations or banking crises, and can therefore be char-
acterised as relatively countercyclical and stable.　Most authors suggest that regardless of the 
ownership structure of a bank, the quality of its balance sheet may be of decisive importance in 
influencing credit supply.　Banks that are in poor condition, wil not be able to expand their 
credit in reaction to positive market signals, but wil instead focus on balance sheet repair (De 
Haas and Naaborg, 2005; Veinea at al, 2008).
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The literature on determinants of bank profitability is very extensive.　However, the majority 
of papers focus on markets with a low presence of foreign banks and sometimes the empirical 
side is ignored.　In particular, two factors have not yet been suficiently explained: first, that 
foreign banks might be diferently afected by certain factors than domestic banks would, and, 
second, that they can be afected by additional factors, such as home country conditions and 
strategies of their parent institutions.　The one study that addresses this issue is the work of 
Wiliams (1998, 1998, 2003), who constructs an empirical model of foreign banks’ profit deter-
minants and tests a number of hypotheses concerning profitability of foreign banks in Australia 
compared with other markets for the great four (ANZ, Westpac, NAB, Commonwealth).　The 
results show that domestic factors do not significantly influence individual banking strategies 
(Wiliams, 2003).
Finaly, in the analysis of foreign banks in Eastern Europe, it is important to take into 
account the transition period, which may explain the generic roots for banks’ profitability.　
Interesting study in this field is Berger et al. (2005) where the authors analyze the static, selection 
and dynamic effects of foreign ownership in Argentina and find that foreign banks select 
slightly less profitable institutions and do not improve their performance afterwards.　Low prof-
itability distribution is also a focus of a study by Peek and Rosengren (1999) focus on the tran-
sition period of foreign bank subsidiaries in the US and atempt to explain their poor 
performance.　They show that banks targeted by foreign acquirers show lower profitability 
prior to acquisition, during the transition period, and in the long run after the change of 
ownership.　Majnoni et al. (2003), suggest otherwise and show that the profitability of Hungarian 
banks increases in the first four years after acquisition by foreign investors and remains positive 
in the long run.
A very comprehensive study on foreign banking expansion in East European countries is 
by De Haas and Naaborg (2005) who analyse foreign banks in transition economies based on 
focused interviews with managers of foreign parent banks, their afiliates, and central bank oficials 
in the EE.　They list a diferential number of channels through which the conditions in the 
home country could have an afect on the profitability of foreign subsidiaries.　For example, in 
the report bt the Narodowy Bank Polski and Bank PekaO (National Bank of Poland) it was 
suggested that due to the worsening economic situation in Germany, some German banks were 
transfering subsidiaries’ profits to the German head ofice though unusualy high dividends.
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Recent trends in foreign banking expansion into East Europe
In the late 1990s and early 2000s due to economic growth and development of financial 
markets, there has been an expansion of credit to the private sector to the EE economies.　A 
number of factors has contributed to the credit expansion — relatively low levels of financial 
development in these countries and growth of demand pressures folowing decades of socialist 
economic management; beter macroeconomic discipline and accession to the European Union 
(EU), which helped lower the country risk premium; and improved access to foreign capital 
folowing the entry of foreign banks and the opening of capital accounts.　Al in al, rapid 
credit growth has played an important role by the mechanism of transfering domestic and foreign 
savings into investment and supporting financial sector development and economic growth in 
this region.
Macroeconomic conditions have been adequate for credit expansion.　With inflation under 
control and improved economic prospects, both due to income convergence and the business 
cycle, have helped expand credit demand in the private sector.　Real lending rates registered a 
progressive decline reflecting a more general trend decline in policy rates.　In some EE economies 
such as Poland and Slovak Republic, currency appreciation has been an important factor in 
stimulating demand for credit.　Predictable exchange rates and expectations of long-term appre-
ciation might have created incentives for borowing in foreign curency and with greater supply 
of funds available, might have stimulated capital inflows funding credit expansion.　In some 
countries, incentives created by easy monetary and/or fiscal strategies may have contributed to 
strong growth in bank credit.
Structural changes in the banking sectors of the EE have created incentives for a rapid 
expansion of credit to the private sector.　A series of bank privatizations in the late 1990s ― early 
2000s improved the incentive structure for banks, while the entry of foreign banks has brought 
additional expertise and know-how into the sector.　With adequate macroeconomic conditions, 
increased investor confidence in EE, and EU accession, many foreign-owned banks have considered 
the EE to be important future markets, where the strategic benefits of expanding market shares 
justify taking on additional credit risks.　Higher profitability of lending in EE markets, 
compared with other EU markets, was another factor that has encouraged the expansion of 
foreign-owned banks in the EE in recent years.　Also subsidies and tax strategies have stimulated 
the growth of selected credit markets.　Construction saving subsidies have promoted saving 
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and lending through building societies in some countries, for example, the Czech Republic and 
Hungary.　Another factor was an adequate tax treatment of housing loans, including tax exemption 
of construction saving yields and the deductibility.
The rapid credit growth has also raised macroeconomic exposure and prudential risks.　
Quantifying these risks may be premature, since the EE have not gone through a ful credit 
cycle yet, and financial reliability indicators tend to improve in the upward phase of the credit 
cycle.　Experiences in industrial and emerging market countries suggest that credit booms can 
be associated with unsustainable domestic demand booms, overheating, and asset price bubbles.
Although there are intraregional diferences, the financial systems of the EE region share 
certain structural characteristics.　Commercial banks constitute the bulk of East European financial 
systems, and private sectors there rely considerably more on bank financing than stock market 
financing.　The concentration of banking sectors is higher than the EU-25 average, but this is 
largely due to the Baltic states (Lithuania, Estonia, Latvia): the share of the five largest credit 
institutions in the EE countries stands at about the EU average (60 percent), whereas in the Baltic 
states it is almost 80 percent.
In diagram 1 we present the number of foreign owned banks and domestic owned banks in 
the whole region for the period 1995-2004.　Two characteristic features are clearly visible First, 
between 1995 and 2004, 28 per cent of total banks in 1995, i.e. 125 banks, disappeared.　Second, 
up to the year 2000 the number of foreign banks increased and domestic owned banks became 
a minority within the banking sector.　It is interesting to point out that foreign bank presence in 
al EE countries is considerably higher than in the European Union countries, with the exception 
of Luxembourg (Claessens et al., 2001; Noyer, 2001). 
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Data include banks from Bulgaria, Croatia, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, 
Poland, Romania and the Slovak Republic.
Source: Central bank survey and EBRD.
Diagram 1　Foreign and domestic banks in East European countries, 1995―2004
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More advanced economies of Poland, Czech Republic, Hungary have experienced the biggest 
inflows of foreign banking capital, while the less developed countries such as Bulgaria, Romania 
received foreign investment at much lower rate.　The share of foreign banks in total assets in 
non-NMS (European Union new member states) is on average larger (74%) than in NMS countries 
(64%).　According to the data from the European Development Bank (EDB) banking investment 
as a total share of FDI (foreign direct investment) varies from 10% in Hungary to some 27% in 
Poland and Slovak republic with the largest foreign investors from Austria, Italy and Greece.
In diagram 2 the dynamics of private and public credit by domestic and foreign banks is 
contrasted and compared.　It shows that credit by domestic banks has been continuously on 
decline since early 1990s while credits extended by foreign banks systematicaly increased in 
absolute and relative terms.
Similar trends can be observed vis-à-vis credit and asset expansion in the Euro-area which 
registered constant growth over the same period.　In particular, deposit money bank assets in 
the euro-area maintained its huge dominance over domestic deposit money bank assets in the 
period of 1993 ―2000.
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Sources: Central bank survey for data on: a) deposit money bank assets, b) foreign banks’ assets/ GDP, c) 
credit to the private sector by deposit money banks/ GDP, and d) foreign bank credit to the private sector/ 
GDP. Foreign bank credit to the public sector was calculated by subtracting d) from b). Domestic bank 
assets were calculated by subtracting b) from a). Credit to the private sector by domestic banks was calcu-
lated by subtracting d) from c). Credit the public sector by domestic banks was calculated as a) minus b) 
minus credit to the private sector by domestic banks. Data include from Croatia, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, 
Lithuania, Poland and Slovenia. Source: Central bank survey.
Diagram 2　Private and public credit by domestic and foreign banks in EE economies 1993―2000
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In the first decade of 2000s credit to the private sector in most EE countries has been exten-
sively growing.　Credit in the Baltic countries expanded at a rate 3 times faster than in the 
other East European economies during 2002–06 (44 percent versus 14 percent, respectively).　
In the later subgroup, the Czech Republic and Poland registered the slowest rate of credit 
growth to the private sector.　Also household credit has been growing more strongly than 
corporate credit in recent years, and, by end –2005, household loans were almost equal to corporate 
loans in importance in banks’ portfolios.　The importance of foreign-currency denominated or 
indexed lending has varied across the EE.　In the Baltic states, the composition of total 
outstanding loans to the private sector has traditionaly been heavily concentrated on foreign 
curency loans.　In 2005, for example, foreign curency loans caried, on average, twice in total 
outstanding loans in the Baltic countries (above 60 percent) that they did in the other East European 
economies (around 30 percent).　Among them, Hungary and Slovenia have experienced rapid 
growth in the share of foreign-currency-denominated loans in total loans to the private sector, 
while the Czech Republic has remained the least exposed, with a further decreasing share.　See 
Tamirisa and Čihák (2006) for an analysis of the factors that contributed to slow credit growth 
in Poland.
On the other hand, foreign banks’ contribution to economic infrastructure and development 
in non – NMS is much smaler.　In this area, foreign banks are more cost-efective but they do 
not contribute much to credit expansion and have rather very limited contribution to the development 
of local credit markets.　According to Naaborg (2001) this is a typical chery-picking strategy.
Table 1 shows the number of foreign banks per country.　In 1995, 114 foreign banks were 
present in the countries in our sample, accounting for 25 per cent of total banks.　In that year, 
the Czech Republic, Hungary and the Slovak Republic already showed relatively high levels of 
foreign bank presence.　In the second part of the 1990s, the relative number of foreign banks 
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Source: Central banks data
Diagram 3　Credit and asset expansion in EE economies, 1993―2000
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grew strongly especialy in Bulgaria, Croatia, Hungary, Lithuania, Poland, and Romania.
The other way of measuring foreign ownership in the banking sector is to calculate the 
ratio of foreign banks’ assets and the sum of total banking assets, including those of domestic 
owned banks.　Diagram 4 shows the relative asset shares of foreign owned banks state-owned 
banks, and domestic owned banks in the period 1995–2004.　The share of state-owned banks 
rapidly declined from 51 per cent in 1995 to 3 percent in 2004.　After several banking crises 
hit most transition countries in the mid-1990s (see Caprio and Klingebiel, 2003 for an overview 
of the diferent crises), bank privatisation significantly increased foreign participation at the end 
of the first decade only in Poland and Slovenia governments remained important stockholders of 
banks.　Similarly to state owned banks, domestic banks lost importance with a lowest level of 
relative assets of 9 per cent in 2000.
Foreign banks’ assets reached 84 per cent in 2002 and remained relatively stable at that 
level.　The data also shows the diference between countries regarding the timing of foreign 
bank entry.　Hungary and Latvia were among the first countries were foreign banks’ assets 
dominated domestic bank assets 1/.
Reports by the central banks indicate that the average foreign ownership of banking in Eastern 
Europe expanded rapidly especialy after 2000 (diagram 4).　Due to mergers and acquisitions, 
relative foreign banks’ assets spur from an average of 40 per cent up to a 70 per cent level.　In 
Romania foreign owned bank assets are growing gradualy few percentages a year.　In Slovenia 
foreign banks are of minor importance in the banking sector.　In 1998, the share of foreign 
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Table 1　Foreign banks in Eastern Europe, 1995―2004
2004200320022001200019991998199719961995
6971767468655025 7 7Bulgaria
4145505649251711 9 2Croatia
74747068656456484342Czech Rep.
67575757574350312726Estonia
71767176796764675749Hungary
39433943575256474026Latvia
505450464636423325 0Lithuania
77797667635137353122Poland
72707773645644393233Romania
76767557574041454855Slovak Rep.
32272721211610121115Slovenia
61616158574742363025Average
Source: Central bank survey and EBRD.
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banks’ assets in Estonia rose to 90 per cent reflecting that its largest banks, Hansapank and 
Eesti Ühispank, were sold to two Swedish banks: Swedbank and Skandinaviska Enskilda 
Banken.　In 1999, foreign banks’ assets in Poland increased from 17 per cent to 49 percent as 
Alied Irish Banks bought 80 per cent in Bank Zachodni, Italian Unicredito acquired 52 per cent 
in Pekao in a second stage privatisation and Bank Austria raised its stake with 20 per cent in 
PKB up to 44 per cent in 1999.1)
Foreign exchange market disturbances and the general instability of financial markets in 
the beginning of the 2000s resulted sometimes in radical changes in banking acquisition 
strategies.　For example in 2001, the Croatian State Agency for Banks bought Rijecka Banka 
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Source: Central banks survey and EBRD.
Diagram 4　Average Foreign Ownership, 1995―2004
1)　Individual cases of foreign banking takeovers are documented in Voinea, 2008; Claeys, 2006; De 
Haan, 2004; Naaborg, 2007). For example, 72 per cent of total banking assets, as Bulgarian largest 
bank Bulbank was privatised and sold to Unicredito. In the meanwhile, foreign banks’ assets in Croatia 
also rise. The increase amounts to 45 per cent points up to 89 per cent of total banking assets, as the 
third and fourth largest banks Splitska Banka and Rijecka Banka were acquired in privatisation by 
Unicredito and German Bayerische Landesbank. In addition, Croatia’s second largest bank, 
Privredna Banka Zagreb, was sold in privatisation to Banca Commerciala Italiana. In the Czech 
Republic foreign banks’ assets grew to 89 per cent of total banking assets, as Austrian Erste Bank 
acquired 52 per cent in privatisation of savings bank Česká Spořitelna, Belgian KBC’s Czech subsidiary 
CSOB took over assets and liabilities of IPB, and German Bankgeselschaft. German banks raised its 
stake from 47 per cent to 85 per cent in Zivnostenska Banka. A year later, French Société Générale 
bought Komercní Banka in privatisation and Erste Bank acquired 71 per cent of the preferential 
shares in Česká Spořitelna. In Lithuania, 78 per cent of banking assets were foreign owned in 2001 
as Swedish Skandinaviska The subsequent changes in ownership of Splitska Banka are exemplary for 
the consolidation that took place in CEE. In 2002, Unicredito sold the bank to Austrian Bank Austria 
Creditanstalt (BACA) due to anti-trust reasons. Folowing German HVBs acquisition of BACA, the 
bank merged with HVB Bank Croatia in 2003. Folowing the Italian Unicredito acquisition of HVB 
in 2005, French Société Générale bought Splitska Banka in 2006, again as a result of anti-trust 
reasons. See the source quoted above.
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for €1, recapitalized, and sold the bank to Austrian Erste and Steiermarkische Bank.　There 
were a number of banking mergers and occasional buy-outs such as the case of Enskilda 
Banken raising its stake in Lithuanian Vilniaus Bankas to 100 per cent after the later had 
merged with Bankas Hermis in 2000, while Finnish Sampo bought majority stake in privatisation 
of Lithuanian Development bank.　In the same year, Estonian Hansapank, owned by Swedish 
Swedbank, bought 90 per cent in savings bank LTB, Lithuanians second largest bank and 
merged it with Hansabankas.　In Poland relative foreign banks’ assets increased up to 72 per 
cent in 2001 as Citibank bought 88 per cent in Bank Handlowy w Warzawie.　In the Slovak 
Republic, Hungarian OTP Bank bought a majority stake in Investicna a Rozvojá Bank establishing 
OTP Bank Slovensko and Erste Bank acquired 87 per cent of savings bank Slovensko Spor-
itelna in privatisation.　In 2001, foreign banks’ assets in the Slovak Republic have increased up 
to 78 per cent of total banking assets.
In spite of rapid expansion of foreign banks into EE there seems to be a consensus of opin-
ions that bank intermediation in this region is stil below the equilibrium levels consistent with 
the levels of economic development of these countries and the structural characteristics of their 
banking sectors.　Adjustment toward equilibrium is expected to continue in the coming years, 
but, its excessively rapid pace may result in macroeconomic and financial instability (Schadler 
and others, 2004).　In fact until 2006 rapid credit growth in the EE has led to a deterioration in 
financial reliability indicators, but prudential risks appeared to be rising in some countries 
(Hilbers and others, 2005; and Iossifov and Khamis, 2006).　A microeconometric study by 
Maechler, Mitra, and Worel (2006) found that, although loan growth generaly had been asso-
ciated with an improvement in the reliability of the EE banks, when it became excessive, loan 
growth could weaken bank reliability.
Foreign exposure and banking risks in Eastern Europe
Most practitioners and academics agree that, the main risk to bank reliability associated 
with rapid loan growth is credit risk.　Credit risk can arise from a number of sources: inappro-
priate loan assessments and dificulties in monitoring and assessing risks; aggressive lending 
strategies; overvalued asset prices or exchange rates; and an excessive concentration of loans.　
Risks associated with rapid credit growth to households are in many respects similar to those 
associated with lending to private sector , but the key diference is the much larger number of 
loans involved (which, on one hand, helps diversification of risks, and, on the other, can make 
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credit decisions and management more labor intensive) and the lower availability of reliable 
financial data.
Market risks can also become an issue in an environment of rapid credit growth.　Interest 
rate risk can rise, for example, if rapid credit growth is accompanied by a greater use of fixed-
rate or foreign currency instruments without banks’ hedging the risk of adverse movements in 
the prices of these assets.　Direct foreign exchange risk may also arise from net open foreign 
exchange positions and external borowing to fund credit growth.
Until 2008 financial reliability indicators for the EE were generaly favourable and capital 
ratios, both relative and absolute, were comparable to those in Western Europe, while returns on 
assets were higher.　Although nonperforming loans were higher, the coverage of nonperforming 
loans by provisions is similar to Western Europe’s.　Banking sectors in the EEs appear more 
capitalized than those in the Baltic states, but at the same time asset quality and provisions 
against bad loans were, on average, lower in the Baltics and profitability was higher.　As 
always, these indicators should be treated with caution as most of them is based on past condi-
tions and not reflecting the curent or future market equilibrium.
Eastern Europe has so far avoided the worst of the global financial market crisis of 2008, 
but that is gradualy changing.　High current-account deficits and a large trade dependence on 
Western Europe pose a potential risk of contagion in future as wel as the risk arising from the 
region’s strong foreign bank presence.　While generaly seen as positive for the EE area, this 
foreign bank presence may have opened the door wider to contagion.
The main factor contributing to the increased risk of foreign banking in Eastern Europe is 
the concentration of banking capital in individual economies.　The market share of majority 
foreign-owned banks has increased since 2000 and is now 60% to 90% of total assets in most 
EE countries, as can be seen in the table below.　Transmission of disturbances happens there 
mainly through problems in financial liquidity and/or annual write-downs in the mostly Austrian, 
Italian, and Swedish parent banks operating in this region.
When ownership of a banking system is highly concentrated in a single foreign country, 
adverse disturbances to that foreign country could easily spil-over and engulf the domestic 
economy economy.　But if foreign investment comes from various countries not closely intere-
lated, then the result wil be a banking system with the corresponding benefits that come from 
risk diversification.
As mentioned above, contagion can be a two-way street.　The EE region makes up a 
significant portion of these international banking groups’ total assets, and Austrian-based banks 
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Table 2　Concentration of bank ownership in East European countries
OriginForeign owner (>50%)BankCountry
ItalyUniCredito ItalianoBULBANKBulgalia
HungaryOTP BankDSK BANK
GreeceNational Bank of GreeceUNITED BULGARIAN BANK
ItalyUniCredito ItalianoZAGREBACKA BANKACroatia
ItalyBanca IntesaPRIVREDNA BANKA
AustriaErsteERSTE & STEIERMARKISCHE BANK
BelgiumKBCCSOBCzech Rep.
AustriaErste BankČESKÁ SPOŘITELNA
FranceSociété GénéraleKOMERGNI BANKA
SwedenSwedbankHANSAPANKEstonia
SwedenSEBSEB EESTI ÜHISPANK
FinlandSampo PLCSAMPO BANK
*OTP BANKHungary
BelgiumKBCKERESKEDELNI ES HITELBANK
GermanyBayerische LandesbankMKB BANK
*PAREKSS BANKALatvia
EstoniaHansapankHANSABANKA
SwedenSEBSEB LATVIJAS UNIBANKA
SwedenSEBSEB VILNIAUS BANKASLithuania
EstoniaHansapankBANKAS HANSABANKAS
DenmarkNORD/LBBANKAS NORD/LB LIETUVA
PolandPolish governmentPKO BPPoland
ItalyUniCredito ItalianoBANK PEKAO
GermanyHVB Group/ BA-CABANK BPH
*ROMANIAN COMMERCIAL BANKRomania
FranceSociété GénéraleBRD
AustriaRaifeissenRAIFFEISEN BANK
AustriaERSTESLOVENSKA SPORITELNASlovak Rep.
ItalyBanca IntesaVSEOBECNA UVEROVA BANKA
AustriaRaifeisenTATRA BANKA
*NOVA LJUBLJANSKA BANKASlovenia
SloveniaGovernment of SloveniaNOVAK KREDITNA BANKA
*ABANKA VIPA
Source: Polityka EE Banks Report, March 2009 and other bank reports
Note: The table shows the majority owner of each of the top 3 biggest banks, by assets, in every CEE 
country. Some banks have no majority owner (*) and their ownership is as folows. OTP BANK 
is listed. Two private individuals own PAREKKS BANKA. Shareholders of the ROMANIAN 
COMMERCIAL BANK are the Agency for Privatisation and Management of State ownership 
APAPS (37%), 5 regional private investment funds (30%), and the EBRD and the IFC (both 
12.5%). The Slovenian state (35%) and Belgian KBC (34%) own NOVA LJUBLJANSKA 
BANKA. Largest shareholder of ABANKA VIPA is insurance company Triglav (33%). Source: 
June 2006 edition of Bureau van Dijks’ BankScope.
Chris Czerkawski
Raifeisen and Erste look particularly exposed to the region.　So any slow-down in economic 
activity there wil have a negative impact on the asset quality and ratings of these banks, which 
might then force them to tighten credit conditions.
Because international banks tend to operate in several East European countries countries, 
the chances of cross-contagion are further heightened.　As seen in the diagram below, 
UniCredit, Raifeisen, and KBC operate in more than ten emerging European countries.　A problem 
in one country could potentialy lead these banks to cut exposure to the rest of the region, given 
the trade and financial linkages between these countries and their similar economic profiles.　
As indicated by Fitch, a major foreign bank might be wiling to bail out a local subsidiary in 
trouble, but may find it more dificult to help out if faced with similar cals for financing from 
other subsidiaries in the region.
In the period of 2006–2008 foreign banks, seem to be taking on more financial risks than 
domesticaly owned banks, although the strength of their parent banks tends to compensate for 
the greater risk taking.　Market indicators of banking system (see Economist Report on East 
European banking, 2008) reliability point to moderate macroprudential risks and a wide range 
of systemic risks According to Fitch’s composite indicators of banking system reliability, macro-
prudential risk is at medium level in al countries, except Poland.　This conclusion is based on 
an early warning model of above-trend private sector credit growth and takes into account the 
possibility of asset price bubbles and curency overvaluation.　The Fitch’s banking system indi-
cator combines the system average of individual bank ratings and a qualitative assessment of 
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Source: UniCredit Fitch Ratings
Diagram 5　Relative sensitivity to external disturbances in the selected foreign banks
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systemic risks, taking into account asset quality, capital adequacy, financial liquidity, and foreign 
exchange exposures, among other things.　In four out of the eight EE countries (the Market 
indicators of EE banks are worse than in major advanced countries but broadly comparable to 
those of banks from other emerging markets.　The exceptions are the market indicators for 
Czech and Estonian banks, which are stronger2). 
In the last decade of 1990s, rapid credit growth in Eastern Europe did not appear to have 
weakened investing banks.　In the years 2006–2008, in the aftermath of financial crisis and 
folowing recessions in many industrialized countries, this has changed and the granting of 
credit is becoming increasingly divorced from bank reliability—al banks, including weak ones, 
seem to be expanding at an equaly rapid pace.　This suggests that prudential risks are on the 
rise and became most apparent in the fastest-growing credit markets.　These markets include 
lending to households, foreign currency-denominated or indexed lending, and lending in the 
three Baltic countries, where weaker banks are expanding at a faster rate than larger banks.
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 Source: UniCredit data
Diagram 6　Foreign exposure of selected foreign banks in Eastern Europe
2) For the EE region, published stress test results point to the resilience of these countries’ banking systems 
to credit risk and market risk. A review of stress-testing results presented in the IMF’s Financial System 
Stability Assessments (FSSAs) and Financial Stability Reports during 2001–04 suggests that banking 
systems should be able to sustain significant macroeconomic disturbances. However, the dispersion 
of stress testing exercises and results across individual banks might be large in some EE countries. 
 In sum, although stress testing results are fairly positive so far in al countries that disclose them to 
the public, there are growing concerns about financial risks associated with rapid credit growth. 
These risks are dificult to quantify given the relatively short credit history of the region.
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Conclusions
Credit markets in many Eastern European countries are now dominated by foreign-owned 
banks.　This ownership structure resulted from the liberalization of foreign bank entry in the 
early 1990s and the privatization of state-owned banks, mainly by seling majority shares to foreign 
investors.　The majority of loans from foreign banks was extended by mergers and take-overs 
rather than by the newly established banks (de novo banks according to the terminology used by 
certain authors).　However, since market entry through acquisition alows acquiring a credit 
portfolio and a customer base, acquired banks were able to expand their market share much 
faster than the foreign de novo banks.　There are also diferences in credit costs between new 
banks and the acquired banks with the reduction in domestic interest rates more evident in the 
de novo banks.　The later ones charge also higher interest rates than foreign acquired banks.　
This result is consistent with the conventional wisdom according to which competition grows if 
the foreign bank enters as a de novo bank.
Among factors influencing foreign banking expansion into Eastern Europe trade and interest 
rate diferentials are significant as they confirm the strategy of folowing their customers and 
exploiting profit opportunities.　Direct investment usualy lag (2-3 years usualy) after portfolio 
flows and are generated through intra-company banking loans and repatriated profits.　On the 
other hand bilateral trade does not require that kind of lags as it would generate profit instantly.　
Institutional factors such as banking reform with more transparent regulations and liberalization 
of local financial markets are also important motives for foreign expansion.　Among other factors, 
distance is not important as the majority of foreign banks come from neighbouring countries 
usualy within the same border of the European Community.　In summary – foreign banks 
seem to be much more interested in speculative investment (interest diferential and exchange 
rate diferential) than in productive investment (weaker significance of FDI in explaining foreign 
banking expansion into this area).
In two-three years after the acquisition, the market share of foreign banks usualy starts to 
grow.　Since this happens after the improvements in banks’ performance, one can argue that 
foreign banks succeeded to increase their market share due to their atractiveness to clients.　
This, in theory, would support the “eficiency” hypothesis and would not result in increased 
costs of competition.　These conclusions seem to be in contrast with findings for developed 
countries, quoted above, where foreign banks are more likely to sacrifice profits for growth.
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The analysis of statistics shows that credit growth in the EE countries during the last decade 
has reflected financial deepening and various macroeconomic factors, such as strong economic 
growth, declining real interest rates, and exchange rate appreciation.　Bank-specific factors, 
such as eficiency, profitability, reliability, and the degree of state ownership, have also influ-
enced credit growth.　Bank reliability has largely been a function of bank-specific factors 
(history, size, financial liquidity, and the degree of foreign ownership) and the level of 
economic and institutional development of the country where the bank is located.
The world financial crisis of 2008 has not weakened European banks significantly so far 
but it has recently become independent of bank reliability.　These findings are broadly consistent 
with the conclusions based on a general analysis of financial reliability indicators and market 
indicators for the EE region, which do not point to any apparent signs of a deterioration in bank 
reliability.　As suggested by several studies (quoted before) bank reliability indicators are not 
pointing to such emerging prudential risks, because they are largely based on system-wide statistics 
and do not take into account the dispersion of reliability indicators across individual banks.　
Foreign banks seem wiling to take on greater risks than domestic banks, and credit growth 
through the EE subsidiaries of foreign-owned banks has been largely unrelated to their 
reliability.
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